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GOVERNMENTAL AID TO RELIGIOUS
ENTITIES: THE TOTAL SUBSIDY
POSITION PREVAILS
G. SIDNEY BUCHANAN*
INTRODUCTION
IN two recent cases, Mueller v. Allen1 and Bowen v. Kendrick,2 the
United States Supreme Court sustained particular forms of govern-
mental financial aid to religious entities. In both cases, the Court, by a 5
to 4 vote, held that the aid in question did not constitute a prohibited
establishment of religion. These two decisions represent the culmination
of a significant conceptual evolution in this difficult area of constitutional
law. In relation to government funding of the secular activities of reli-
gious entities, the Court, in Mueller and Kendrick, has moved to what
can be fairly characterized as a "total subsidy" position.3
Under the total subsidy position, governmental aid to religious entities
is constitutionally permissible if two conditions are met. First, the aid
must support only the secular activities of the religious entity involved
(the "no religious use" restriction). Second, the aid must be offered
under substantially equal conditions to non-religious entities, both public
and private (the "equal access" restriction). If these two conditions are
met, Mueller and Kendrick teach us that the aid in question does not
violate the establishment clause. Under this approach, the amount of
government aid received by a religious entity does not affect the question
of constitutionality. Moreover, it does not matter that the government
aid received by the religious entity frees other funds for use by the entity
in the support of its religious activities.4 If the above two conditions are
met, the governmental aid survives attack.
Clearly, the total subsidy position operates generously in favor of gov-
* Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston. A.B. 1956, Princeton Univer-
sity; J.D. 1959, University of Michigan School of Law.
1. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
2. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
3. The "total subsidy position" is a phrase coined by the author in a 1978 law review
article. See Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Sectarian Schools: A Study in Corrosive
Precedents, 15 Hous. L. Rev. 783, 822 (1978). The phrase has its origin in cases such as
DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), in
which the court noted that allowing government to aid the secular activities of religious
schools would allow "almost total subsidy of a religious institution by assigning the bulk
of the institution's expenses to 'secular' activities." Id. at 120. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971) (affirming DiCenso), Justice Douglas quoted this passage in his con-
curring opinion. See id. at 641.
4. "One fixed principle in this field is our consistent rejection of the argument that
'any program which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation' vio-
lates the Establishment Clause." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 393 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 742 (1973)).
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ernment aid to the secular activities of religious entities. Government
programs aiding religious organizations can meet the constitutional re-
quirements of the total subsidy position with little difficulty. Under this
position, the degree of governmental aid to religious entities is left largely
to the political process for resolution.
Part I of this Article will engage in a critical analysis of the total sub-
sidy position as manifested in the Mueller and Kendrick decisions and
will explore the conceptual and policy implications of that position. Part
II will briefly review three options that the Court could utilize in its es-
tablishment clause analysis. While accepting the emergence of the total
subsidy position as a fait accompli that cannot be practically reversed,
Part III will conclude by rejecting that position as applied in the majority
opinions of Mueller and Kendrick. Instead, in the spirit of the Mueller
and Kendrick dissents, Part IV of this Article urges that the no religious
use and equal access restrictions of the total subsidy position be applied
more sternly in determining the constitutional validity of governmental
aid to religious entities5 and that only a narrow application of the total
subsidy approach can ensure that the enduring values embodied in the
establishment clause are adequately protected.
I. THE TOTAL SUBSIDY CASES
A. Mueller v. Allen
1. The Majority Opinion
In Mueller v. Allen,6 the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a
Minnesota statute that allowed a state income tax deduction for the "ac-
tual expenses incurred for the 'tuition, textbooks and transportation' of
dependents attending elementary or secondary schools." 7 The maximum
5. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the religious guarantees of the first
amendment apply in full measure to state governments and their political subdivisions by
reason of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1947). Accordingly, as used in this article, govern-
ment aid includes aid provided by either the federal or state governments.
6. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). Then Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices White, Powell and O'Connor.
7. Id. at 391. The Minnesota statute read as follows:
"Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to
exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent
in grades 7 to 12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in
attending an elementary or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Da-
kota, South Dakota, Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may
legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for
profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, 'textbooks' shall mean and include
books and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and
secondary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught
in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include
instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doc-
trines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or
[Vol. 58
TOTAL SUBSIDY POSITION
deduction was "$500 per dependent in grades K through 6 and $700 per
dependent in grades 7 through 12. " 8 This deduction was available to all
parents who sent their children to any accredited public or private
school. In the school year prior to the Court's decision, 820,000 students
attended public elementary and secondary schools in Minnesota, while
approximately 91,000 students attended some 500 private schools in
Minnesota. Around 95% of the students attending private schools were
enrolled in sectarian schools.9
The Court acknowledged that "the Establishment Clause presents es-
pecially difficult questions of interpretation and application,""0 stating
that the "general nature of our inquiry in this area has been guided"'I by
the three-part test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 2 Under the Lemon
test, to survive a challenge that it violates the establishment clause, a
statute must first "have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
-.. ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entan-
glement with religion.' "13 Characterizing the Lemon test as providing
"'no more than [a] helpful signpos[t],' "14 the Court turned to the Min-
nesota statute.
The Court concluded that the statute easily satisfied the secular pur-
pose requirement of the Lemon test15 reasoning that "[a] State's decision
to defray the cost of educational expenses incurred by parents-regard-
less of the type of schools their children attend--evidences a purpose that
is both secular and understandable." 6 Such a program of assistance
"plainly serves [the] secular purpose of ensuring that the State's citizenry
worship, nor shall it include such books or materials for, or transportation to,
extracurricular activities including sporting events, musical or dramatic events,
speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar nature."
Id. at 390 n.1 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 290.09(22) (1982)). This statute was subsequently
repealed by 1987 Minn. Laws c. 268, art. 1, § 127.
8. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391.
9. See id.
10. Id. at 392.
11. Id. at 394.
12. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Because the phrase total subsidy position is the author's
invention, it is not possible to describe exactly the relationship between the total subsidy
position and the three-part test adopted by the Court in Lemon. Analysis of the type
embodied in the total subsidy position is an unacknowledged undercurrent in many
Supreme Court establishment clause cases. In most cases involving total subsidy con-
cerns, the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test is easily satisfied, and the Court fo-
cuses on the primary effect and excessive entanglement prongs. In this author's opinion,
the Court, while applying the Lemon test in name, is in substance using the equal access
and no religious use restrictions of the total subsidy position in its application of the
primary effect and excessive entanglement prongs of the Lemon test. Further, the restric-
tions of the total subsidy position appear to be applied by the Court primarily in its
analysis of the primary effect prong.
13. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
14. Id. (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
15. See id. at 394-95.
16. Id. at 395.
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is well educated." 17 Moreover, financial support flowing to private
schools, both sectarian and nonsectarian, enables such schools to educate
"a substantial number of students" and thus "relieve[s] public schools of
a correspondingly great burden-to the benefit of all taxpayers." 18 For
these and other reasons, the Court held that the Minnesota statute satis-
fied "the secular purpose inquiry" of the Lemon test. 19
The Court then turned to the "more difficult" 20 primary effect prong
of the Lemon test. After stressing the traditionally broad latitude ac-
corded to legislatures in the enactment of tax statutes, 21 the Court dis-
cussed a series of primary effect weight factors that it believed supported
the validity of the Minnesota statute. First and foremost among these
factors was the equal access condition of the total subsidy position.
Here, the Court noted that the deduction under the Minnesota statute "is
available for educational expenses incurred by all parents, including
those whose children attend public schools and those whose children at-
tend nonsectarian private schools or sectarian private schools.",2 2 The
Court reasoned that " '[t]he provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum
of groups is an important index of secular effect.' "23 In this respect, the
Court distinguished the Minnesota program from that involved in Com-
mittee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist24 under which
"public assistance amounting to tuition grants was provided only to par-
ents of children in nonpublic schools."'25
Under its primary effect analysis, the Court also stressed the fact that
the direct aid recipients were not the sectarian schools. Here, the Court
noted that "by channeling whatever assistance it may provide to paro-
chial schools through individual parents, Minnesota has reduced the Es-
tablishment Clause objections to which its action is subject.",26 In the
Court's opinion, this more indirect form of aid carried less risk of the
"'imprimatur of state approval' ,27 of religion and rendered more "at-
tenuated" the financial benefits flowing to religious schools under the
Minnesota statute. In the Court's words: "The historic purposes of the
[Establishment] Clause simply do not encompass the sort of attenuated
financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of individ-
ual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally
available tax benefit at issue in this case."'28
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 396.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 397.
23. Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
24. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
25. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398 (1983).
26. Id. at 399.
27. Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
28. Id. at 400.
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Based on these factors, the Court held that the Minnesota statute satis-
fied the primary effect prong of the Lemon test.2 9 In so holding, the
Court declined "to engage in [an] empirical inquiry"3 into the question
of which group of taxpayers benefited most from the tax deductions al-
lowed under the Minnesota program.31 This refusal to examine the ac-
tual economic effect of the Minnesota program constitutes a major
weakness in the Court's analysis, which Justice Marshall strongly criti-
cized in his dissenting opinion.32 This Article argues that inquiry into
actual economic effect is a legitimate and persuasive means of determin-
ing whether a particular form of governmental aid has the primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion. 33
Turning to the third part of the Lemon test, the Court had "no diffi-
culty in concluding that the Minnesota statute does not 'excessively en-
tangle' the State in religion.",34  The main entanglement concern
stemmed from the statute's requirement that state officials disallow de-
ductions for the cost of" 'instructional books and materials used in the
teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the purpose of which is
to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship.' "-3 While conceding that
this requirement would involve some degree of oversight on the part of
the state, the Court held that "[m]aking decisions such as this does not
differ substantially from making the types of decisions approved in ear-
lier opinions of this Court."36 Accordingly, the oversight required by the
statute fell far short of the "'comprehensive, discriminating, and contin-
uing state surveillance' "'I necessary to constitute a violation of the es-
tablishment clause under the entanglement prong of the Lemon test.
Therefore, the statute's prohibition against deductions for the cost of re-
ligiously oriented textbooks and materials also satisfied the "no religious
use" restriction of the total subsidy position.
2. The Marshall Dissent
Justice Marshall's dissent in Mueller3 1 focused on the Court's analysis
of the primary effect prong of the Lemon test. The dissent argued that
the Minnesota statute failed to meet either of the conditions of the total
subsidy position adopted by the majority. Under the dissent's analysis,
the program authorized by the statute did not provide an adequate safe-
guard against the use of government aid for religious purposes nor did it
29. Id. at 402.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 408-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. See infra notes 186-196 and accompanying text.
34. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983).
35. Id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 290.09(22) (1982)).
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
38. Id. at 404 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion in Mueller was writ-
ten by Justice Marshall and joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens.
1989]
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make such aid available to users of non-religious entities on substantially
the same basis as to users of religious entities. The program thus violated
both the no religious use and equal access conditions of the total subsidy
position.
On the equal access front, the dissent engaged in the empirical inquiry
eschewed by the majority and examined closely the actual economic ef-
fect of the tax deductions authorized by the Minnesota statute. Noting
that "the single largest expense that may be deducted under the Minne-
sota statute is tuition,"39 the dissent stated that "[fjewer than 100 of
more than 900,000 school-age children in Minnesota attend public
schools that charge a general tuition."'' Moreover, "[o]f the total
number of taxpayers who are eligible for the tuition deduction, approxi-
mately 96% send their children to religious schools."4 1 Based on these
figures, the dissent characterized the Minnesota statute as "little more
than a subsidy of tuition masquerading as a subsidy of general educa-
tional expenses."'42 The dissent conceded that parents sending their chil-
dren to public schools could, under the Minnesota program, deduct such
educational expenses as "the cost of gym clothes, pencils, and note-
books,"'43 but characterized such expenses as "de minimis in comparison
to tuition expenses." 44
In substance, therefore, the dissent saw the Minnesota program as tai-
lor-made for the users of religious schools. 45 While on its face aiding the
users of all schools, public and private, the Minnesota statute had the
actual economic effect of benefiting the users of religious schools.4 6
From a practical economic perspective, the users of public schools did
not enjoy "equal access" to the aid authorized by the Minnesota statute
because the main benefit of that aid, tuition deductions, could only be
realized by users of tuition-charging schools which were primarily reli-
39. Id. at 408.
40. Id. at 409.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 408-9.
43. Id. at 408.
44. Id. at 409.
45. The "hand-tailored" concept was persuasively advanced by Justice Fortas in his
dissenting opinion in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 269 (1968):
This is not a "general" program. It is a specific program to use state funds to
buy books prescribed by sectarian schools which, in New York, are primarily
Catholic, Jewish, and Lutheran sponsored schools. It could be called a "gen-
eral" program only if the school books made available to all children were pre-
cisely the same-the books selected for and used in the public schools. But this
program is not one in which all children are treated alike, regardless of where
they go to school. This program, in its unconstitutional features, is hand-tai-
lored to satisfy the specific needs of sectarian schools. Children attending such
schools are given special books-books selected by the sectarian authorities.
How can this be other than the use of public money to aid those sectarian estab-
lishments? Id. at 270-71.
46. The dissent's economic analysis is set forth in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 408-
11 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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gious schools.47 For these reasons, the dissent concluded that the Minne-
sota program was in substance the same as the New York program
condemned by the Court in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist.4 s
In Nyquist, the Court held unconstitutional a New York program of
"public assistance amounting to tuition grants [that were] provided only
to parents of children in nonpublic schools."'49 That, reasoned the dissent
in Mueller, was precisely the substantive economic effect of the tax de-
ductions authorized by the Minnesota statute.50
In the second branch of its attack on the majority opinion in Mueller,
the dissent argued that the Minnesota program contained no practical
guarantee against the use of government aid for religious purposes and,
therefore, violated the no religious use restriction of the total subsidy
position. The dissent stressed that "the assistance that flows to paro-
chial schools as a result of [the tax deduction for tuition] is not restricted,
and cannot be restricted, to the secular functions of those schools."52 In
a similar vein, the dissent argued that "Minnesota's tax deduction for the
cost of textbooks and other instructional materials is also constitutionally
infirm."5" The dissent concluded that instructional materials "plainly
may be used to inculcate religious values and belief"5 4 and urged the
Court to overrule its 1968 decision in Board of Education v. Allen,55
which held that a state may lend secular textbooks to parochial schools
without violating the establishment clause.56 That decision, argued the
dissent, "is simply untenable, and is inconsistent with many of our more
recent decisions concerning state aid to parochial schools."5 7 The dissent
stressed that, in contrast to the program sustained in the 1968 Allen deci-
sion, the Minnesota statute did not limit deductions for textbook costs to
books approved for use in Minnesota's public schools.
5 8
The Mueller dissent attacked the manner in which the majority ap-
plied the total subsidy position without framing a sterner test to deter-
mine the validity of government aid to religious entities. The dissent
argued persuasively that the Minnesota program did not even meet the
no religious use and equal access conditions of the total subsidy position.
47. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
48. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
49. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398.
50. See id. at 408-11.
51. See id. at 413-15.
52. Id. at 413.
53. Id. at 414.
54. Id.
55. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
56. See id. at 248. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Board of Education v. Allen
stressed that books are readily subject to ideological manipulation. Accordingly, when
government purchases books "for use by sectarian schools," government "directly assists
the teaching and propagation of sectarian religious viewpoints in clear conflict with the
First Amendment's establishment bar." Id. at 252-53.
57. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 415 (1983).
58. See id.
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However, the dissent did not address the question of whether the total
subsidy position is the most appropriate test for determining when a pro-
gram of governmental aid constitutes a prohibited establishment of reli-
gion. The Mueller majority, in contrast, vigorously embraced the total
subsidy position without strictly enforcing its conditions. While giving
lip service to those conditions, the majority drained them of practical
force by refusing to inquire into the actual economic effect of the Minne-
sota program.
B. Bowen v. Kendrick
1. The Majority Opinion
Bowen v. Kendrick 59 is an intriguing case, involving a challenge to fed-
eral funding of "services relating to adolescent sexuality and preg-
nancy."6 Congress passed the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA or
Act) "in 1981 in response to the 'severe adverse health, social, and eco-
nomic consequences' that often follow pregnancy and childbirth among
unmarried adolescents."6 " The Court described AFLA as "a scheme for
providing grants to public or nonprofit private organizations or agencies
'for services and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual rela-
tions and pregnancy.' "62 The Court further explained:
[G]rant recipients are to provide two types of services: "care services,"
for the provision of care to pregnant adolescents and adolescent par-
ents, and "prevention services" for the prevention of adolescent sexual
relations. While the AFLA leaves it up to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services... to define exactly what types of services a grantee
must provide, the statute contains a listing of "necessary services" that
may be funded. These services include pregnancy testing and mater-
nity counseling, adoption counseling and referral services, prenatal and
postnatal health care, nutritional information, counseling, child care,
mental health services, and perhaps most importantly for present pur-
poses, "educational services relating to family life and problems associ-
ated with adolescent premarital sexual relations." 63
Based on a congressional finding that "'problems of adolescent pre-
marital sexual relations' "' are "'best approached through a variety of
integrated and essential services,' "65 AFLA requires grant recipients to
describe how they will involve various private groups, including both
religious and nonreligious organizations, and public entities in the provi-
sion of services. 66 AFLA contains no express restriction against the use
59. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988). The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy.
60. Id. at 2565.
61. Id. at 2566 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 2567 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(8)(A) (1982)).
65. Id. (quoting 42 U.SC. § 300z(a)(8)(B) (1982)).
66. See id.
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of grant money for religious purposes, an omission described by the Ken-
drick dissenters as "glaring."
67
The Kendrick Court summarized the history of grant applications and
awards under AFLA:
Since 1981, when the AFLA was adopted, the Secretary has received
1,088 grant applications and awarded 141 grants. Funding has gone to
a wide variety of recipients, including state and local health agencies,
private hospitals, community health associations, privately-operated
health care centers, and community and charitable organizations. It is
undisputed that a number of grantees or subgrantees were organiza-
tions with institutional ties to religious denominations.
68
In 1983, a group of federal taxpayers, clergymen, and the American
Jewish Congress challenged the constitutionality of AFLA by filing suit
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Seeking
both declaratory and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs argued that AFLA,
on its face and as applied, constituted a prohibited establishment of reli-
gion in violation of the first amendment. The district court sustained this
challenge, holding "AFLA ... invalid both on its face and as applied
'insofar as religious organizations are involved in carrying out the pro-
grams and purposes of the Act.' ,,69 On appeal, the Supreme Court
concluded:
first, that the District Court erred in holding that the AFLA is invalid
on its face, and second, that the [district] court should consider on
remand whether particular AFLA grants have had the primary effect
of advancing religion. Should the court conclude that the Secretary's
current practice does allow such grants, it should devise a remedy to
insure that grants awarded by the Secretary comply with the constitu-
tion and the statute. The judgment of the District Court is accordingly
[r]eversed.7°
The Kendrick Court used the same three-prong Lemon test employed
in Mueller. The Court first applied the test to the contention that AFLA
was unconstitutional on its face. The Court had little difficulty in con-
cluding that "AFLA was motivated primarily, if not entirely, by a legiti-
mate secular purpose-the elimination or reduction of social and
economic problems caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and
parenthood. '71 The Court rejected the argument "that Congress had an
impermissible purpose in adopting the AFLA because it specifically
amended [AFLA's predecessor] to increase the role of religious organiza-
tions in the programs sponsored by the Act.",72 The expressed congres-
67. Id. at 2594.
68. Id. at 2568 (citation omitted).
69. Id. (quoting Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at 48a, Bowen v. Kendrick,
108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (No. 87-431)).
70. Id. at 2581.
71. Id. at 2571.
72. Id.
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sional purpose of involving a broad range of public and private
organizations in alleviating the problems of teenage pregnancy led the
Court to conclude that AFLA's express reference to religious entities was
not evidence of a congressional purpose to engage in a prohibited en-
dorsement of religion.73
Having disposed of the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test, the
Court turned to the primary effect prong. The Court first considered the
contention that AFLA impermissibly advanced religion by expressly rec-
ognizing the role of religious organizations in addressing problems of
teenage sexuality.74 The Court rejected this contention, stating that
"[n]othing in our previous cases prevents Congress from... recognizing
the important part that religion or religious organizations may play in
resolving certain secular problems. ' 75 To the extent that such a recogni-
tion advances religion, the Court described the effect as "'incidental and
remote.' "76 Moreover, the Court stressed that AFLA's recognition of
religious entities occurs within the broader context of the Act's recogni-
tion of the roles played by a wide range of organizations, religious and
nonreligious, in alleviating the problems of teenage sexuality.7 7 In the
Court's view, "this reflects the statute's successful maintenance of 'a
course of neutrality among religions, and between religion and non-
religion.' "78
As it continued its primary effect analysis, the Court considered the
fact that AFLA permits religious institutions to receive federal funds.79
The Court cited a series of cases as support for the proposition that "reli-
gious institutions are [not] disabled by the First Amendment from partic-
ipating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs."'80 The Court
stressed the variety of organizations that are eligible for grants under
AFLA and concluded that "nothing on the face of the Act suggests the
AFLA is anything but neutral with respect to the grantee's status as a
sectarian or purely secular institution."8 The Court's analysis is persua-
sive on this point. AFLA does appear to grant equal access to all grant
applicants without regard to their religious or nonreligious character.
Consequently, in form and substance, AFLA satisfies the equal access
condition of the total subsidy position. Unlike the tax deduction pro-
gram in Mueller, the program authorized by AFLA does not have the
primary economic effect of benefiting religious entities or their users to
the practical exclusion of secular entities and their users.82 AFLA is not
73. See id.
74. See id. at 2572.
75. Id. at 2573.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 2567, 2573.
78. Id. at 2573 (quoting School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985)).
79. See id.
80. Id. at 2574.
81. Id. at 2573.
82. On this point, AFLA closely approximates the program of governmental aid sus-
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a subterfuge for funneling governmental aid to religious entities while
providing only token aid to secular organizations. As will be discussed
shortly, AFLA's fundamental problem lies elsewhere.
The Court next addressed the difficult conceptual question of whether
AFLA impermissibly advances religion because it does not require that
funds received by religious entities under the Act be used only for secular
purposes. Essentially, this is a contention that AFLA violates the no
religious use condition of the total subsidy position. In considering this
contention, the Court rejected two related arguments: first, that the reli-
gious entities receiving grants under AFLA constitute "'pervasively sec-
tarian' institutions;""3 second, that AFLA "authorizes 'teaching' by
religious grant recipients on 'matters [that] are fundamental elements of
religious doctrine,' such as the harm of premarital sex and the reasons for
choosing adoption over abortion." 4 Each of these arguments, if true,
supports the broader contention that AFLA permits religious organiza-
tions receiving grants under the Act to use government funds for reli-
gious purposes.
The Court tackled the "pervasively sectarian" institution argument
first. Relying on an earlier case, the Court defined such an institution as
one " 'in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its
functions are subsumed in the religious mission.' "85 The Court con-
ceded that the receipt of governmental aid by such institutions created
the threat that the funds, even if slated for a specified secular purpose,
would advance the sectarian institution's "'religious mission,' "86 but
promptly dismissed this concern by concluding that only a small propor-
tion of AFLA aid recipients could be considered pervasively sectarian. 7
The Court noted that "nothing on the face of the AFLA indicates that a
significant proportion of the federal funds will be disbursed to 'perva-
sively sectarian' institutions."8 8 The risk that such organizations would
be funded, held the Court, was not great enough to justify a facial invali-
dation of AFLA or even an invalidation of AFLA as applied to religious
entities that are not pervasively sectarian.89
The Court was equally clear that AFLA does not impermissibly ad-
vance religion merely "because the religiously affiliated AFLA grantees
will be providing educational and counseling services to adolescents.- 90
tained in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, a New Jersey
program authorized local school districts to reimburse parents for the cost of transport-
ing their children to school, whether the school be public or private, sectarian or non-
sectarian. Under this program substantial economic benefits flowed both to the users of
secular and religious institutions.
83. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2574-75 (1988).
84. Id. at 2576.
85. Id. at 2574 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
86. Id.
87. See id. at 2575.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id.
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When governmental aid is received by religious entities that are not per-
vasively sectarian, the Court has "refused to presume that it would be
used in a way that would have the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion."91 Moreover, the Court stressed that a finding of prohibited effect
could not be based on "the possibility or even the likelihood that some of
the religious institutions who receive AFLA funding will agree with the
message that Congress intended to deliver to adolescents through the
[Act]." 92 In short, the Court held that the educational and counseling
services in which AFLA permits religious entities to engage do not vio-
late the no religious use restriction of the total subsidy position. Implicit
in the Court's holding on this point is the questionable assumption that
the educational and counseling services authorized by AFLA are not
readily susceptible to ideological manipulation by the organizations pro-
viding the services.93
The Court was not troubled by the absence in AFLA of an express
provision restricting the use of grant funds for religious purposes. The
majority noted that AFLA requires grant applicants to describe in detail
the services they hope to provide, how they intend to provide those serv-
ices and, further, that AFLA requires evaluation of services that grantees
actually provide. These requirements, the Court concluded, "create a
mechanism whereby the Secretary can police the grants that are given
out under the Act to ensure that federal funds are not used for impermis-
sible purposes."'9 4 Given that statutory scheme, the Court held that the
AFLA's lack of an express limitation on the use of federal funds for reli-
gious purposes did not have "the primary effect of advancing religion."95
The Court next turned to the entanglement prong of the Lemon test.
Here, the Court conceded that the government would have to monitor
the actual use of funds received by grant recipients under AFLA. The
Court, however, repeated its earlier conclusion that "there is no reason to
assume that the religious organizations which may receive grants are
'pervasively sectarian' in the same sense as the Court has held parochial
schools to be."9 6 Building on that conclusion, the Court reasoned that
the monitoring required under AFLA would be less intrusive than that
required in the case of federal grants to pervasively sectarian institutions.
Accordingly, the Court held that the degree of monitoring required
under AFLA did not constitute "excessive entanglement" between gov-
ernment and religion in violation of the establishment clause.9 7
While the bulk of the Kendrick opinion examined the facial validity of
AFLA, the Court considered more briefly the "as applied" challenge to
91. Id. at 2576.
92. Id.
93. As will be seen shortly, the Kendrick dissenters vigorously attacked and rejected
this assumption. See id. at 2588-91; infra notes 111-130 and accompanying text.
94. Id. at 2577.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2578.
97. See id.
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AFLA and, in substance, rejected it as well. The Court conceded that
some AFLA grantees had indeed engaged in impermissible activities, 98
but concluded that the district court "did not adequately design its rem-
edy to address the specific problems it found in the Secretary's adminis-
tration of the statute." 99 In light of that conclusion, the Supreme Court
remanded the case to the district court, directing that court to "consider
... whether particular AFLA grants have had the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion" and, if so, to "devise a remedy to insure that grants
awarded by the Secretary comply with the constitution and the
statute."100
2. The Blackmun Dissent
Justice Blackmun began his dissent 1° ' by questioning whether Con-
gress intended that government funds would support a program which
instructed parents and teenagers:
"You want to know the church teachings on sexuality.... You are the
church. You people sitting here are the body of Christ. The teachings
of you and the things you value are, in fact, the values of the Catholic
Church." 10 2
Citing this and other examples of the types of religious instruction sup-
ported by AFLA grants, the dissent stated that "[w]hatever Congress
had in mind, . . . it enacted a statute that facilitated and, indeed, en-
couraged the use of public funds for such instruction, by giving religious
groups a central pedagogical and counseling role without imposing any
restraints on the sectarian quality of the participation.""0 3 Such a record,
the dissent urged, made it clear that AFLA grantees were using govern-
ment monies to support religious indoctrination. 104
The dissent then moved to attack the majority opinion more specifi-
cally. The dissent first criticized what it characterized as a "central
premise" of the Court's opinion, that "the primary means of ascertaining
whether a statute that appears to be neutral on its face in fact has the
effect of advancing religion is to determine whether aid flows to 'perva-
sively sectarian' institutions."'1 5 The dissent argued that the Court's
premise was flawed for two reasons. First, the majority employed a nar-
row view of what constitutes a pervasively sectarian institution, largely
limiting that label to parochial schools. 106 That approach "seems to
98. See id. at 2580.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2581.
101. Id. at 2582 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This dissent, written by Justice Blackmun,
was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens.
102. Id. at 2583.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 2585.
106. See id. at 2586.
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equate the characterization with the institution" ' 7 and effectively pre-
cludes extending the "pervasively sectarian" label to religious entities
other than parochial schools.108 Second, the dissent argued that the
Court "err[ed] in suggesting that the inapplicability of the label is gener-
ally dispositive."' 0 9 To the contrary, the dissent urged, the Court "never
has treated the absence of such a finding as a license to disregard the
potential for impermissible fostering of religion."" 0 This is especially
true in cases involving direct governmental aid to religious entities.
After it attacked the majority's use of the concept of the "pervasively
sectarian institution," the dissent moved to its own analysis of AFLA
under the Lemon test. Accepting the majority's view of AFLA's essen-
tially secular purpose," 'I the dissent turned to the primary effect prong of
the Lemon test." 2 Here, the dissent considered three factors that it be-
lieved to be dispositive: the actual recipient of the aid, 113 the age of those
targeted by the programs, 114 and the nature of the service supported."
15
The influence of these factors convinced the dissent that the aid author-
ized by AFLA had the primary effect of advancing religion in violation
of the establishment clause.
The dissent stressed that the aid authorized by AFLA involved "direct
cash subsidies" to religious organizations." 6 The aid did not reach the
religious entities indirectly by distribution to the users of such entities.
When the aid recipient is the religious entity itself and not the user of the
entity, "much closer scrutiny into the expected and potential uses of the
[aid]"" 17 is required to ensure that the aid will "not be used inconsistently
with the Establishment Clause.""' 8 Citing past decisions, the dissent
noted that a crucial safeguard against the prohibited use of direct aid to
religious entities is that it be in a form already approved for use in public
entities.' Under A-FLA, "[t]he teaching materials that may be
purchased, developed, or disseminated [by religious entities] with AFLA
funding are in no way restricted to those already selected and approved
for use in secular contexts."' 120 Accordingly, the dissent argued that
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 2587.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 2587-88.
114. See id. at 2588-90.
115. See id. at 2590-91.
116. Id. at 2587.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 2587-88 (citing Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975)).
120. Id. at 2588.
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AFLA lacked the guarantees necessary to protect against a prohibited
use of government funds distributed directly to religious organizations.
With regard to the age of those targeted by AFLA, the dissent empha-
sized that governmental aid to religious entities serving persons of pre-
college age has always been scrutinized more closely than aid to religious
entities serving persons of college age and older.121 In decisions sus-
taining direct governmental aid to colleges with religious affiliations, for
example, "the Court has relied on the assumption that 'college students
are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination.
... The skepticism of the college student is not an inconsiderable barrier
to any attempt or tendency to subvert' "122 governmental prohibitions
against the use of aid for religious purposes. Under AFLA, however, the
"targeted audience" is composed primarily of pre-college age adoles-
cents. Moreover,
AFLA, unlike any statute this Court has upheld, pays for teachers and
counselors, employed by and subject to the direction of religious au-
thorities, to educate impressionable young minds on issues of religious
moment. Time and again we have recognized the difficulties inherent
in asking even the best-intentioned individuals in such positions to
make "a total separation between secular teaching and religious
doctrine."
' 123
The dissent agreed with the district court "that asking religious organiza-
tions to teach and counsel youngsters on matters of deep religious signifi-
cance,"' 124 while expecting the teachers to maintain a position of secular
purity, "is both foolhardy and unconstitutional." '125 For the dissent,
therefore, the age factor strongly suggested that AFLA's primary effect is
to advance religion in violation of the establishment clause.
Even more troubling to the dissent was the nature of the service sup-
ported by AFLA. The dissent noted that AFLA authorizes grant recipi-
ents to counsel teenagers on a wide range of problems associated with
teenage sexuality, "including the encouragement of adoption and pre-
marital chastity and the discouragement of abortion."'1 26 It can "hardly
be doubted," urged the dissent, that when such values are "promoted in
theological terms by religious figures, [the] values take on a religious na-
ture."' 12 7 The pedagogical nature of the services supported by AFLA
made them, in the opinion of the dissent, peculiarly susceptible to ideo-
logical manipulation. While conceding that government support of secu-
lar social welfare services is not prohibited by the Constitution simply
121. See id. at 2589-90.
122. Id. at 2589 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2588.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2590.
127. Id.
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because the services are provided by a religious organization, the dissent
stressed that
[t]here is a very real and important difference between running a soup
kitchen or a hospital, and counseling pregnant teenagers on how to
make the difficult decisions facing them. The risk of advancing reli-
gion at public expense, and of creating an appearance that the govern-
ment is endorsing the medium and the message, is much greater when
the religious organization is directly engaged in pedagogy, with the
express intent of shaping belief and changing behavior, than where it is
neutrally dispensing medication, food, or shelter. 128
Accordingly, the dissent saw guidance on matters of conscience as the
dominant feature of the services supported by AFLA. Because such
services are more susceptible to religious indoctrination than services
from which such guidance is absent, the dissent concluded that the na-
ture of the service supported factor weighed strongly against the consti-
tutionality of AFLA. 29 In combination, therefore, the aid recipient, age,
and nature of the service supported factors led the dissent to conclude
that AFLA, on its face, had the primary effect of advancing religion in
violation of the establishment clause. 130
The aid recipient, age, and nature of the service supported factors are
thus crucial in determining whether a particular form of governmental
aid has violated the no religious use restriction of the total subsidy posi-
tion. The dissent reasoned that all three factors worked strongly against
the constitutionality of AFLA and concluded that AFLA contained in-
adequate safeguards against the use of governmental aid for religious
purposes. Accordingly, even under the liberal framework of the total
subsidy option, AFLA does not pass constitutional muster. As in Muel-
ler, the dissent in Kendrick was able to attack the majority opinion
within the framework of the total subsidy position without having to de-
termine whether a more stringent test should be employed in establish-
ment clause cases.
To bolster its primary effect analysis, the Kendrick dissent stressed the
"remarkable omission" 131 of any provision in AFLA prohibiting the use
of governmental aid for religious purposes. Noting the presence of such
a restriction in earlier decisions sustaining governmental aid to religious
entities, the dissent stated that the absence of such a provision in AFLA
"compounded" '32 the problem and made it still more clear that AFLA
128. Id. at 2591.
129. The dissent contrasted the services supported by AFLA with those supported in
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), "a case in which the Court upheld the appro-
priation of money for the construction of two buildings to be part of a religiously affili-
ated hospital." Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2591 n.11 (1988). Providing
medical aid to the sick, reasoned the dissent, is primarily not a mind-training function
and, therefore, is not readily susceptible to ideological manipulation. See id.
130. See Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2587-95.
131. Id. at 2592.
132. Id.
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lacked adequate safeguards against the use of governmental funds for
religious purposes. 133 The dissent characterized as "disingenuous[] ' ' 134
the majority's position that a "no religious use" restriction in AFLA is
unnecessary because its legislative history reveals a "legislative intent not
to promote religion."' 35 For the dissent, the absence of an express statu-
tory prohibition against the use of governmental funds for religious pur-
poses created an unacceptable risk that governmental aid would be used
to promote religion in violation of the establishment clause. Without
such a prohibition, the executive branch cannot create an enforcement
mechanism with sufficient "bite" to police the grants authorized by
AFLA.' 36
Having completed its analysis of the primary effect prong, the dissent
dealt briefly and bluntly with the constitutionality of AFLA under the
Lemon test's entanglement prong. The dissent concluded that "the un-
constitutionality of the statute becomes even more apparent when we
consider the unprecedented degree of entanglement between Church and
State required to prevent subsidizing the advancement of religion with
AFLA funds."1 37 In reaching this conclusion, the dissent stressed three
factors. First, the religious entities benefited under AFLA have a strong
motivation to advance their religious positions through the counseling
they provide to teenagers. 13  Second, it is very difficult to separate the
religious and secular elements in counseling teenagers on matters of sexu-
ality. 39 Finally, the grants authorized by AFLA are not "one-time con-
struction grants" but, instead, extend over a period of time, thereby
requiring a continuing financial relationship between government and re-
cipient religious entities."4 These factors convinced the dissent that the
grant program authorized by AFLA would require an impernissible de-
gree of government supervision to ensure that grants received by reli-
gious entities are not used for religious purposes. In the dissent's view,
the necessity for such ongoing and pervasive surveillance of religious en-
tities clearly fosters an excessive entanglement between government and
133. See id. at 2591-94.
134. Id. at 2592.
135. Id. at 2594.
136. The Kendrick dissent appears to be treating the absence of a no religious use
provision as a separate ground for finding that AFLA has the primary effect of advancing
religion in violation of the establishment clause. In other words, the absence of such a
provision constitutes a per se violation of the no religious use restriction of the total
subsidy position. Even if such a provision had been present in Kendrick, it seems clear
that the dissent, through application of the aid recipient, age and nature of the service
supported factors, would still have concluded that AFLA violated the no religious use
restriction of the total subsidy position. For the dissent, therefore, the presence of an
express no religious use provision is a sine qua non; its absence means certain defeat for
programs of government aid to religious entities.
137. Id. at 2595.
138. See id. at 2596.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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religion. 41
In summarizing its position, the dissent concluded that "[t]he statu-
tory language [of AFLA] and the extensive record established in the Dis-
trict Court make clear that the problem lies in the statute and its
systematically unconstitutional operation, and not merely in isolated in-
stances of misapplication."' 14 z Accordingly, the dissent, without remand,
would have found AFLA unconstitutional. 43
II. A TALE OF THREE CONCEPTUAL OPTIONS
In a 1978 article entitled Governmental Aid To Sectarian Schools: A
Study in Corrosive Precedents,'" this author discussed three conceptual
approaches that the Court might employ to determine the validity of
government aid to sectarian schools: (1) the Wolman option;' 45 (2) the
Rutledge option;' 46 and (3) the total subsidy option.' 47
The Wolman option takes its name from the Court's 1977 decision in
Wolman v. Walter,' in which the Justices sustained certain forms of
governmental aid to sectarian schools and invalidated others.' 49 Under
the Wolman option, the Court employs an ad hoe balancing of factors
approach in determining the validity of governmental aid to sectarian
schools.'50 While this balancing occurs within the framework of the
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. 15 Hous. L. Rev. 783 (1978).
145. See id. at 815-22.
146. See id. at 827-36.
147. See id. at 822-27.
148. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
149. In Wolman, for example, the Court sustained governmental programs that pro-
vided the following types of aid to sectarian schools (similar types of aid were also pro-
vided to public schools and to non-sectarian private schools): secular textbooks, testing
and scoring services, diagnostic services, and remedial services. In Wolman, the Court
invalidated governmental aid to sectarian schools in the form of instructional materials
and equipment and certain field trip services. See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 785-88 for a
detailed description of the Wolman holding. As stressed by Justice Stevens in his sepa-
rate opinion in Wolman, "[t]he line drawn by the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment must ... have a fundamental character." Wolman, 433 U.S. at 265. The
distinctions drawn by the Wolman majority lack that quality.
150. Some of the factors include whether the government aid is distributed to parents
of all schoolchildren or only to those who send their children to private schools which are
primarily sectarian, see Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782 n.38
(1973); whether the government aid is restricted to secular purposes and activities, see id.
at 774; whether the service supported by the government aid is susceptible to ideological
manipulation, see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975); whether the government
aid is given to institutions in which the religious and secular functions are "'inextricably
intertwined,'" id.; whether the service supported by the government aid occurs on the
premises of a religious institution, see id. at 367, or at a neutral site, see Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 245 (1977); whether the service supported by the government aid is
"prepared" by government employees or by the employees of a religious institution, see
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 654-58 (1980).
Under the Wolman option, these and other factors were applied by shifting majorities of
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three-prong Lemon test, the results under this approach are difficult to
predict and, in some instances, even more difficult to defend."5 Because
of these weaknesses, it is understandable that a majority of the present
Court has chosen to discard the Wolman option and to embrace the total
subsidy position, which offers more certainty in its application and re-
sults. Under the Wolman option, the Court, in the late 1970s, had by its
own admission reached a point at which the permissible scope of govern-
ment aid to sectarian schools turned upon difficult questions of degree
and a point at which the dividing line between church and state had
become a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier ...."I"
The Rutledge option was advanced by Justice Rutledge in his dissent
in Everson v. Board of Education.'53 Had it been adopted by a Court
majority, establishment clause jurisprudence would have followed a sig-
nificantly different course in the post-Everson years. Rutledge advanced
the view that the Court should invalidate any form of governmental aid
that is specifically earmarked to defray any part of the total cost of edu-
cation in sectarian schools.' 54 In Everson, for example, Rutledge's ap-
the Court in a manner that made it difficult to predict the outcome of particular cases.
While the Court professed to be applying these factors within the framework of the
Lemon test, it is clear that no ongoing majority of the Court was connecting these factors
to the three parts of the Lemon test in a consistent and understandable manner.
151. For example, in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court sustained a
Pennsylvania program authorizing the state "to lend textbooks without charge to chil-
dren attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools that meet the Common-
wealth's compulsory-attendance requirements." Id. at 353-54. The Meek Court
invalidated a Pennsylvania program authorizing the state "to lend directly to the nonpub-
lic schools 'instructional materials and equipment, useful to the education' of nonpublic
school children." Id. at 354. Such materials and equipment included periodicals, photo-
graphs, maps, charts, sound recordings, films, projection equipment, recording equip-
ment and laboratory equipment. Succinctly stated, therefore, the Meek Court held that
books supplied to students are "in" and maps supplied to sectarian schools are "out."
The Meek Court also invalidated a Pennsylvania program providing various "auxiliary
services," such as counseling, testing, and psychological services, to nonpublic school
students. See id. at 367-73. Although provided to such students by public school system
personnel, the Court held that such services were susceptible to ideological manipulation
because they were rendered "only on the nonpublic school premises, and only when 're-
quested by nonpublic school representatives.'" Id. at 367. Later, in Wolman, this "on-
site" factor was decisive for the Court majority in sustaining an Ohio program rendering
similar services to nonpublic school students but only when performed "in public schools,
in public centers, or in mobile units located off the nonpublic school premises." Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 245 (1977). Distinctions such as these rendered the Wolman
option hopelessly unpredictable as an analytical framework for determining when a pro-
gram of government aid was a prohibited establishment of religion.
152. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 236 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971)).
153. 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The aid in question in Everson
was approved by a 5 to 4 vote and thus, the Rutledge option was not adopted by the
Court.
154. This is the general test that emerges from Part III of Rutledge's dissenting opin-
ion in Everson. See id. at 44-49. In describing the New Jersey plan involved in Everson,
Rutledge stated:
Here parents pay money to send their children to parochial schools and funds
raised by taxation are used to reimburse them. This not only helps the children
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proach would have invalidated that part of New Jersey's education
program that reimbursed parents for the cost of transporting their chil-
dren to sectarian schools. 155  These transportation reimbursements
would be invalidated even though the same kind of aid was made avail-
able to parents of children attending both public and nonsectarian pri-
vate schools and even though the aid benefiting the users of sectarian
schools was subject to stringent restrictions against its use for religious
purposes. For Rutledge, the questions of equal access and no religious
use were not dispositive. Instead, he based his decision on whether gov-
ernment aid defrayed any part of the total cost of sectarian education as
it did in Everson.
The Rutledge option is strong medicine. If applied in the spirit advo-
cated by its author, the Rutledge option would have invalidated most, if
not all, of the forms of government aid to sectarian schools that the
Court sustained in its post-Everson decisions.1 56 Only two principal
forms of governmental aid would have likely survived under the Rut-
ledge approach: government aid limited to public schools or to students
attending public schools, and governmental health, safety, and welfare
programs conditioned wholly on non-school related criteria such as the
age, residence, or economic status of the recipient. The latter category
would have embraced such community-wide forms of service as police
and fire protection, which would not have been prohibited merely be-
cause some of the recipients attended sectarian schools. 157 However, as
to get to school and the parents to send them. It aids them in a substantial way
to get the very thing which they are sent to the particular school to secure,
namely, religious training and teaching.
Id. at 45. Accordingly, Rutledge concluded that transportation expenses are clearly part
of the total cost burden of educating students in sectarian schools. A governmental pro-
gram defraying these expenses constitutes, therefore, a prohibited establishment of reli-
gion. See id. at 45-49.
155. In relation to transportation expenses, Rutledge stressed:
[T]ransportation, where it is needed, is as essential to education as any other
element. Its cost is as much a part of the total expense, except at times in
amount, as the cost of textbooks, of school lunches, of athletic equipment, of
writing and other materials; indeed of all other items composing the total
burden.
Id. at 47-48. Payment of transportation costs, he argued,
is no more, nor is it any the less essential to education, whether religious or
secular, than payment for tuitions, for teachers' salaries, for buildings, equip-
ment and necessary materials.... No rational line can be drawn between pay-
ment for such larger, but not more necessary, items and payment for
transportation. The only line that can be so drawn is one between more dollars
and less. Certainly in this realm such a line can be no valid constitutional
measure.
Id. at 48-49.
156. See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 829 for a more detailed discussion of the legal
consequences of the Rutledge option.
157. Such expenditures, argued Rutledge,
are of a nature which does not require appropriations specially made from the
public treasury and earmarked, as is New Jersey's here, particularly for reli-
gious institutions or uses. The First Amendment does not exclude religious
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soon as the governmental aid in question is earmarked to defray any of
the cost of education in sectarian schools, the Rutledge option would
invalidate it. This option, for example, clearly would have invalidated
the Minnesota program sustained in Mueller to the extent that tax de-
ductions are specifically made available to users of religious schools.
In a 1978 article, I argued that the Court should discard the Wolman
option then in use and adopt the Rutledge approach. 15 8 It was my opin-
ion in 1978, and still is today, that the Rutledge option best advances the
meaning and policy behind the establishment clause. 15 9 In the last dec-
ade, however, much conceptual water has gone over the dam, and I am
now persuaded that adoption of the views of Justice Rutledge would be
impractical because it would defeat entrenched programs of government
aid that have been established in reasonable reliance on the Court's post-
Everson decisions."6 Instead, I now acquiesce, albeit grudgingly, in the
conceptual position that the Court now uses in this area of the law: the
total subsidy option. However, to avoid a continuation of its present im-
proper application, I urge that the Court apply this approach more strin-
gently in determining the constitutionality of government aid to religious
organizations than it did in the Mueller and Kendrick decisions.
In the late 1970s the Court began its shift from the then prevailing
Wolman option to the total subsidy option. The Court's 1976 decision in
Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board 161 reflects this shift. In Roe-
mer, the Court sustained a Maryland statutory program that provided
grants to private colleges, including a significant number of religious in-
stitutions. Funding was subject to the restriction that the money not be
used for "sectarian purposes."'1 62 The plurality described the religious
property or activities from protection against disorder or the ordinary acciden-
tal incidents of community life. It forbids support, not protection from interfer-
ence or destruction.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 61 n.56 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). "Cer-
tainly," acknowledged Rutledge, "the fire department must not stand idly by while the
church burns." Id. at 61.
158. See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 827-38.
159. I am not alone in this position. Justice Douglas was among the Everson majority
that rejected the Rutledge option in 1947. In a later decision, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962), Douglas recanted:
The Everson case seems in retrospect to be out of line with the First Amend-
ment. Its result is appealing, as it allows aid to be given to needy children. Yet
by the same token, public funds could be used to satisfy other needs of children
in parochial schools-lunches, books, and tuition being obvious examples. Mr.
Justice Rutledge stated in dissent what I think is durable First Amendment
philosophy.
Id. at 443 (Douglas, J., concurring). For supporters of the Rutledge option, Douglas'
recantation can be fairly described as "the shift not made in time to save the nine" from
scholarly criticism.
160. The decimating effect of the Rutledge option on post-Everson programs of govern-
mental aid is described in detail in my 1978 Article. See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 829.
Few, if any, of these programs would survive application of the Rutledge option.
161. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
162. Id. at 739.
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colleges benefited by the program as not " 'so permeated by religion that
the secular side cannot be separated from the sectarian.' ,163 The plural-
ity also recognized the student age factor and stressed the greater intel-
lectual maturity and independence of college-age students as contrasted
with the more malleable minds of younger students. 164 These three fac-
tors convinced the plurality that the Maryland program did not consti-
tute a prohibited establishment of religion. 165
With respect to government aid to religious colleges, the Roemer deci-
sion thus embraced the total subsidy position.1 66 For a period after Roe-
mer, the Court adhered to the Wolman option in determining the validity
of governmental aid to religious schools at below the college level. In its
1977 Wolman decision1 67 and its 1980 decision in Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan,168 the Court continued to apply
the ad hoe balancing of factors approach that is the hallmark of the Wol-
man option. Even at the pre-college level, however, the dike could not
hold against the total subsidy option. In its 1983 Mueller decision,1 69 the
Court abandoned the Wolman option and adopted the total subsidy op-
tion in a case involving governmental aid to elementary and secondary
religious schools. The emergence of the total subsidy position became
even more apparent in the Kendrick decision.17 In this non-school aid
case, the Court adopted the total subsidy position as the controlling con-
ceptual framework for all cases involving government aid to any religious
entity (school or otherwise). After Kendrick, it is clear that if the no
religious use and equal access conditions of the total subsidy position are
met, government aid to a religious entity will be sustained.
163. Id. at 759 (quoting Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 387 F. Supp. 1282,
1293 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 426 U.S. 736 (1976)).
164. See id. at 764.
165. Because the form of governmental aid in Roemer involved annual noncategorical
grants, the Roemer plurality characterized the excessive entanglement prong of the
Lemon test as presenting a "more difficult" question than the primary effect prong. Id. at
761-62. On this aspect of the case, the plurality stressed again the character of the insti-
tutions involved in Roemer: colleges and universities in which the encouragement of
spiritual development is only one secondary objective. See id. at 762-65. In light of this
lesser emphasis on the inculcation of religious values, the Court concluded that the moni-
toring of annual grants to these institutions did not create a significant risk of excessive
governmental entanglement with religion. See id.
166. The program at issue in Roemer satisfied the equal access condition because aid
was offered to private colleges regardless of any religious affiliation. The express prohibi-
tion against use of the aid for religious purposes, the age factor, and the Court's convic-
tion that the secular could be separated from the religious in the sectarian colleges
receiving aid convinced the Court that the no religious use condition was also satisfied.
The program thus, satisfied the two conditions of the total subsidy option and the Roemer
Court required nothing more.
167. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
168. 444 U.S. 646 (1980). In Regan, the Court upheld a New York statute that appro-
priated public funds to reimburse parochial schools for the expense of administering
state-prepared examinations. The Court's decision involved the careful balancing of
finely-tuned factors in the spirit of the Wolman option. See id. at 653-61.
169. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
170. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
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III. THE TOTAL SUBSIDY POSITION TRIUMPHANT: GENERAL
OBSERVATIONS
As discussed in my 1978 article,17' the total subsidy position has sev-
eral commendable features. First, it eliminates many of the troublesome
questions of degree that afflicted the Court in its application of the Wol-
man option. The dubious distinctions generated by the Wolman option
largely disappear. As noted earlier, under the total subsidy option, ques-
tions concerning the propriety of government aid to religious entities are
remitted primarily to the political process. From the judicial perspective,
if the aid in question meets the no religious use and equal access restric-
tions of the total subsidy position, the Court will routinely approve it.
Conceptually, therefore, the total subsidy position enhances predictabil-
ity in the establishment clause area because judicial approval of nearly all
forms of government aid to religious entities is a foregone conclusion.
The total subsidy position also possesses a type of integrity that
matches conceptual application with functional result. The total subsidy
position does not attempt to conceal the consequences which result from
its application. It proceeds bluntly on the premise that government has
the constitutional power to aid any secular function of religious organiza-
tions through broad and recurring noncategorical grants. Under the to-
tal subsidy position, as applied in Mueller and Kendrick, the Court
avoids a debilitating inquiry into the nature and quality of the aid that
government provides to religious entities; judicial review is confined to a
loose policing of the no religious use and equal access conditions of that
position. Thus, the conceptual framework of the total subsidy position is
ideally suited to produce the intended functional result: court approval
of nearly all forms of government aid to religious entities.'72
The total subsidy option also has a strong equitable appeal. Parents
who send their children to sectarian schools do, to some extent, bear a
double economic burden. The existence of this burden was readily con-
ceded, and its nature aptly described, by Justice Rutledge in his Everson
dissent:
No one conscious of religious values can be unsympathetic toward
the burden which our constitutional separation puts on parents who
desire religious instruction mixed with secular for their children. They
pay taxes for others' children's education, at the same time the added
cost of instruction for their own. Nor can one happily see benefits
denied to children which others receive, because in conscience they or
their parents for them desire a different kind of training others do not
171. See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 822-27.
172. "Intended functional result" refers to the result intended by those persons, be
they judges, legislators, scholars, or otherwise, who favor a construction of the establish-
ment clause that permits generous government aid to religious entities. For various pol-
icy reasons, such people support generous government funding of the secular activities of
religious organizations and are happy to embrace a construction of the establishment
clause that permits this funding.
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To the extent that government subsidizes the cost of secular education in
religious schools, the burden described by Rutledge would be eliminated.
As a final argument in its favor, the total subsidy option enhances the
educational choices of parents and children by enabling generous govern-
ment funding of the secular educational activities of private schools, both
sectarian and nonsectarian. That funding facilitates the growth of all pri-
vate schools, thereby contributing to a healthy and competitive pluralism
in the nation's educational system. 174 Proponents of the total subsidy
option argue persuasively that sectarian schools "uniquely contribute to
the pluralism of American society by their religious[ly oriented educa-
tional] activities."' 17 5 Hence, government aid to sectarian schools "con-
tributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential
to a vigorous, pluralistic society."1 76 Outside of the school context, the
Kendrick majority used this support of pluralism argument in sustaining
a program of government aid to religious organizations offering counsel
and advice to adolescents on matters of teenage sexuality. As viewed by
the majority, these recipients were merely part of a broader spectrum of
recipients, both public and private, each contributing in unique and di-
verse ways to the resolution of an urgent national problem.
177
Despite its positive features, the total subsidy option is seriously
flawed. It may exacerbate political division along religious lines, one of
the primary dangers that the establishment clause was intended to
avoid. 178 The practical effect of the total subsidy position is to eliminate
173. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 58 (1947).
174. In the related area of tax exemptions for property devoted to religious use, Justice
Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970),
extolled the virtue of pluralism in these words:
[G]overnment grants [tax] exemptions to religious organizations because they
uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society by their religious ac-
tivities. Government may properly include religious institutions among the va-
riety of private, nonprofit groups that receive tax exemptions, for each group
contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to
a vigorous, pluralistic society.
Id. at 689.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2571-74 (1988).
178. As Justice Rutledge stated in his dissent in Everson:
The reasons underlying the [First] Amendment's policy have not vanished
with time or diminished in force. Now as when it was adopted the price of
religious freedom is double. It is that the church and religion shall live both
within and upon that freedom. There cannot be freedom of religion, safe-
guarded by the state, and intervention by the church or its agencies in the state's
domain or dependency on its largesse. The great condition of religious liberty is
that it be maintained free from sustenance, as also from other interferences, by
the state. For when it comes to rest upon that secular foundation it vanishes
with the resting. Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, educa-
tional or other, brings the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of sect
against sect for the larger share or for any. Here one by numbers alone will
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almost all remaining constitutional restraints on governmental aid to reli-
gious entities, thereby remitting to the political process all significant
questions pertaining to the nature and extent of such aid. This, in turn,
may encourage religious entities to pursue their funding requests more
aggressively in Congress and in the state legislatures. The Court persua-
sively set forth the dangers of increased political division along religious
lines in Lemon v. Kurtzman:
The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal
political process. To have States or communities divide on the issues
presented by state aid to parochial schools would tend to confuse and
obscure other issues of great urgency. We have an expanding array of
vexing issues, local and national, domestic and international, to debate
and divide on. It conflicts with our whole history and tradition to per-
mit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume such importance in
our legislatures and in our elections that they could divert attention
from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of
government. 179
By easing the constitutional restraints on government aid to religious or-
ganizations, the total subsidy position promotes the evils so aptly de-
scribed in Lemon.
The total subsidy option may also accelerate a trend more damaging
than political division along religious lines: the deterioration of the qual-
ity of education in public schools. Many observers believe that the
American system of public education is in deep trouble, and that the
quality of education in public schools, as reflected in student attitudes
and performance, is spiraling downward.180 A significant cause of this
alarming trend is the lack of adequate financial resources. In the present
political climate, citizens are reluctant to tax themselves at the level re-
quired for quality public education."' Moreover, spreading community
indifference to the plight of public education inhibits necessary remedial
benefit most, there another. That is precisely the history of societies which have
had an established religion and dissident groups. It is the very thing Jefferson
and Madison experienced and sought to guard against, whether in its blunt or in
its more screened forms. The end of such strife cannot be other than to destroy
the cherished liberty. The dominating group will achieve the dominant benefit;
or all will embroil the state in their dissensions.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (citations and footnotes omitted).
179. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971) (citation omitted).
180. See Tifft, Who's Teaching Our Children?, Time, Nov. 14, 1988, at 58; High Schools
Under Fire, Time, Nov. 14, 1977, at 62. Indeed, President Bush recently convened a
summit to discuss the nation's education problems with the state governors. See
Weinraub, Hope and Dissent Blend in Education Conference, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1989,
at B13, col. 1. The summit concluded with an agreement to create national goals aimed
at "eliminating illiteracy, reshaping curriculums and holding teachers accountable for
their performance." Weinraub, Bush and Governors Set Education Goals, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 28, 1989, at A10, col. 1.
181. See, e.g., Weinraub, Hope and Dissent Blend in Education Conference, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 1989, at B13, col. 2 (few called for more federal financial aid to schools
at recent education summit).
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action. This indifference increases as more parents elect to send their
children to private schools.
Taxpayer reluctance to support public education will almost certainly
intensify under the total subsidy option. To the extent that government
subsidizes the cost of secular education in sectarian schools (and of edu-
cation in nonsectarian private schools generally), the financial burden of
sending children to such schools is lessened. If, under the total subsidy
position, government aids private schools with substantial and recurring
noncategorical grants, can it be doubted that increasing numbers of par-
ents would send their children to private schools? And, as parents exer-
cise that option, can it be doubted that their sense of commitment to
public education would lessen appreciably? While loss of commitment to
public education is impossible to quantify, it is realistic to assume that
the total subsidy option will discourage taxpayer support of public educa-
tion. This tendency to encourage taxpayer apathy toward the plight of
public education represents a major policy weakness in the total subsidy
position, a weakness not adequately addressed by the growth-of-plural-
ism argument discussed earlier.
The total subsidy option, therefore, earns mixed reviews. On balance
its negative features outweigh its positive features. Conceptually, it is a
position difficult to square with the maintenance of a "high and impreg-
nable" '182 wall between church and state. If, in this area, the Court were
writing on a blank slate, I would oppose a conceptual position that per-
mits government, at its option, to bear a substantial part of the financial
burden of running the church-related schools of the nation. The Court,
however, is now encumbered by its decisions in the post-Everson era, in
which it moved, almost ineluctably, to its current total subsidy position.
In that context, I accept the total subsidy position as a "necessary evil"
and turn to the task of describing how it can be most fairly and effec-
tively applied to promote establishment clause values.
IV. CABINING THE TOTAL SUBSIDY POSITION
If, like the man who came to dinner, the total subsidy position is here
to stay,18 3 it ought to be applied in a way that preserves meaningful con-
stitutional restraints on government aid to religious entities. It should
not be applied in a way that constitutes a total abdication to the political
process. The dissenting opinions in Mueller and Kendrick show the way.
182. Justice Black uses this phrase in his majority opinion in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
183. The Man Who Came To Dinner, written by George Kaufman and Moss Hart, is a
play about a seemingly harmless dinner invitation which leads to a lengthy visit. The
guest, a famous radio personality, falls and fractures his hip and must stay in his hosts'
home as he recovers. The obnoxious visitor spends a lengthy recuperation period in his
hosts' home during which he meddles in their affairs and becomes a nuisance. When he is
finally prepared to leave, the "dinner guest" falls and injures himself again. One begins to
get the feeling that this man who came to dinner may never leave. Similarly, there is no
sign that the total subsidy option will disappear any time in the near future.
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Within the liberal framework of the total subsidy position, there is still
some room for the application of safeguards that can effectively preserve
establishment clause values.
Courts may employ either strict or relatively loose applications of the
no religious use and equal access restrictions of the total subsidy position.
If the restrictions are applied loosely, questions concerning the propriety
of governmental aid to religious entities will be left, in large measure, to
the political process for resolution. If applied tightly, the courts can still
play a significant role in determining the constitutional validity of such
aid. More fundamentally, if the restrictions of the total subsidy position
are tightly applied, the courts will be better able to advance what Justice
O'Connor has persuasively argued is the main purpose of the establish-
ment clause: to prohibit "government from making adherence to a reli-
gion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community." '84 As noted by O'Connor:
Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways.
One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which may
interfere with the independence of the institutions, give the institutions
access to government or governmental powers not fully shared by
nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation of political con-
stituencies defined along religious lines. The second and more direct
infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion.
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.1 85
If applied firmly, the equal access and no religious use restrictions are
well suited to protect against the two dangers described by O'Connor and
safeguard the fundamental values protected by the establishment clause.
A. The Equal Access Restriction: Legal Formalism
Versus Economic Reality
If a legal formalism approach is taken with respect to the equal access
restriction, it will provide few safeguards for establishment clause values.
Under the legal formalism approach, the Court would inquire only into
the legal structure of challenged government aid, and not into the practi-
cal reality of its economic effect. Viewed formally, when governmental
aid is offered on substantially the same terms to both religious and non-
religious entities, the equal access condition is satisfied. If the legal struc-
ture of the aid program creates equal access for the users of both
religious and nonreligious entities, it does not matter that the economic
benefits of the program flow primarily, or even overwhelmingly, to the
184. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 687-88 (citations omitted). See Dow, Toward a Theory of the Establishment
Clause, 56 UMKC L. Rev. 491 (1988), for a thoughtful and persuasive development of
the "outsider" theme advanced by O'Connor in her Lynch opinion.
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users of religious institutions.186
The Rehnquist majority opinion in Mueller is the paradigmatic exam-
ple of the legal formalism approach to equal access. 187 Viewed solely
from the perspective of legal structure, the Minnesota aid program of-
fered the same income tax deductions to users of both religious and non-
religious schools. For the Mueller majority, this satisfied the equal access
condition.'88 And, as noted earlier, the Mueller majority expressly re-
fused "to engage in [an] empirical inquiry into those persons benefited
by"' 89 the Minnesota program.
The Mueller Court's legal formalism approach strips the equal access
requirement of meaning. As a technical matter of legal right, govern-
ment can almost always phrase a program of aid to provide equal access
to users of both religious and nonreligious entities, even if the program,
in practical terms, favors the users of religious entities. Thus, the legal
formalism approach provides no real safeguard against a program of gov-
ernmental aid that has the primary economic effect of supporting reli-
gious entities or their users.
The equal access condition can operate effectively to preserve estab-
lishment clause values only under an approach which weighs the eco-
nomic realities of a particular program of government aid. Under this
approach, as employed by Marshall's dissent in Mueller,190 the Court
would make the empirical inquiry that the Mueller majority declined to
make. The Court would examine the actual operation of a challenged
program to determine its practical economic effect. If that effect pro-
vides only a minimal benefit for nonreligious entities or their users and a
substantial benefit for religious entities or their users, the challenged pro-
gram would be held not to satisfy the equal access condition. In terms of
the Lemon test, the program would be held to have a primary effect that
advances religion.
186. The distinction described in the text between legal formalism and substantive re-
ality manifests itself in many areas of the law. Cases involving the construction and
application of federal tax laws are particularly illustrative. For example, in Morsman v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 90 F.2d 18 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 701
(1937), the Eighth Circuit considered the validity, for federal income tax purposes, of a
trust in which the settlor, at the time of the trust's creation, was the sole trustee and sole
living beneficiary of the trust. In holding that the trust was not a valid trust for tax
purposes, the court stated:
It is true that a legal transaction will not be denied its intended effect though an
underlying motive may have been the evasion of taxes. But the transaction may
always be scrutinized to see whether it is in reality what it appears to be. Sub-
stance and not form should control in the application of tax laws.
Id. at 22 (citations omitted). In a 1921 case, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]e recog-
nize the importance of regarding matters of substance and disregarding forms in applying
the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment and income tax laws enacted thereunder."
United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921).
187. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
188. See id. at 397-99.
189. Id. at 402.
190. See id. at 404.
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This emphasis on economic reality is necessary because it protects
against the dangers of entanglement and endorsement described by
O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Lynch.19' Requiring that a pro-
gram of government aid provide a substantial economic benefit for users
of nonreligious entities is a practical safeguard which reduces the likeli-
hood of excessive governmental entanglement with religious institu-
tions. 192 Such a requirement would also lessen the likelihood that the
program will be motivated by an official purpose to endorse religion or
that it will be perceived as an endorsement of religion by objective ob-
servers. When government aid is actually dispensed to a broad spectrum
of organizations, some religious and some nonreligious, the dangers of
entanglement and endorsement attenuate, and establishment clause val-
ues become more secure. For these reasons, it is important to make an
inquiry into practical economic effect the touchstone of the equal access
condition.
From the perspective of economic reality, the program of aid consid-
ered in Everson did meet the equal access restriction of the total subsidy
position. The challenged program provided substantial economic bene-
fits to users of both religious and nonreligious entities since both groups
incurred costs in transporting their children to school. Not surprisingly,
therefore, New Jersey's action in reimbursing parents for the costs of
transporting their children to accredited schools, whether religious or
nonreligious, created little practical danger of entanglement or endorse-
ment. On this point, the distinction between the Everson and Mueller
programs is abundantly clear, and it is that distinction that the Court
should recognize in its policing of the equal access condition. Judged in
terms of economic reality, the Everson and Mueller programs represent
the conceptual paradigms at opposite ends of the equal access spectrum.
Before leaving the economic reality inquiry, it is important to tie this
inquiry to the primary effect prong of the Lemon test. Admittedly, it is
difficult to discern whether a government program has the primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion. 193 For example, there is no "way to
measure with precision the "endorsing effect" of the programs sustained
in Mueller and Kendrick. We can, however, determine whether, in prac-
tical economic terms, a program of governmental aid is tailor-made for
religious institutions or their users. If, as in Mueller, users of religious
191. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
192. There are usually many beneficiaries of a government program providing substan-
tial aid to both religious and nonreligious organizations or their users. In such a pro-
gram, each category of recipients guards against an administrative mechanism that would
encourage or permit excessive government entanglement with any one category of recipi-
ents. This practical safeguard is not present in programs in which the only recipients of
substantial economic aid are religious entities or their users.
193. The Kendrick majority conceded the difficulty of discerning primary effect: "As
usual in Establishment Clause cases, the more difficult question is whether the primary
effect of the challenged statute is impermissible." Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562,
2571 (1988) (citation omitted).
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institutions are the only recipients of significant economic benefits under
a program of government aid, the conclusion that the challenged pro-
gram has the primary effect of endorsing religion should follow as a mat-
ter of law. The conclusion of endorsing effect flows from the established
reality of economic benefit.
Even primary economic effect may be difficult to discern in some cases.
This, however, is one of those perpetually recurring questions of degree
that the legal system handles regularly. 194 In some cases, as in Mueller,
it is abundantly clear that only users of religious institutions are receiving
significant economic benefits under the challenged program of govern-
ment aid. As we move along the continuum from Mueller to government
programs in which secular organizations and their users also receive sig-
nificant economic benefits, the program's "endorsing religion" effect is
blunted and an objective observer would be less likely to perceive the
program as an endorsement of religion. 195 And, as a program's endors-
ing effect lessens, the Court should be less ready to hold that a program
has the primary effect of advancing religion. Thus, an empirical inquiry
into economic effect is justified by the tie between that effect and per-
ceived endorsement in the eyes of an objective observer.1 96
194. "The law is not indifferent to considerations of degree." Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring). This sensitivity to
questions of degree was evidenced in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the Court refused to extend the right of
privacy to protect the private sexual conduct of two homosexual males and sustained the
validity of a Georgia law making such conduct a crime. While concurring in the Court's
opinion, Powell reserved for later consideration the question of punishment under the
Georgia statute. He noted that "[u]nder the Georgia statute a single act of sodomy, even
in the private setting of a home, is a felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence
imposed to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, first-degree arson, and robbery."
Id. at 197-98 (citations omitted). In Powell's opinion, a sentence of "long duration"
under the Georgia statute "would create a serious Eighth Amendment issue." Id. at 197.
195. The governmental program sustained in Kendriek is an example of a program in
which "[f]unding has gone to a wide variety of recipients, including state and local health
agencies, private hospitals, community health associations, privately-operated health care
centers, and community and charitable organizations." Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2568. As
stressed in the text, the problem with the Kendrick program stems from the no religious
use condition of the total subsidy position.
196. In establishment clause cases, the concept of the "objective observer" has its main
roots in the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984). In the application of the primary effect prong of the Lemon test, O'Connor ar-
gued that "[w]hat is crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of communi-
cating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion." Id. at 692.
Shortly thereafter, in her concurring opinion in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472
U.S. 703 (1985), O'Connor distinguished the constitutionally invalid exemption for reli-
gious practices granted in the state law before the Court from the exemption for religious
practices that Title VII permits in its provisions prohibiting employment discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. With respect to Title VII,
O'Connor stated:
[A] statute outlawing employment discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin has the valid secular purpose of assuring employment
opportunity to all groups in our pluralistic society. Since Title VII calls for
reasonable rather than absolute accommodation and extends that requirement
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B. The No Religious Use Restriction
In Kendrick, the dissent applied the no religious use restriction more
stringently than did the majority. As discussed above, the dissent found
three factors to be of special relevance in determining whether the no
religious use restriction was satisfied: the actual recipient of the aid,197
the age of those targeted by the programs, 198 and the nature of the ser-
vice supported.' 99 The dissent concluded that all three factors operated
against the validity of AFLA, the government program challenged in
Kendrick. °" The Kendrick majority acknowledged the relevance of
these factors, but applied them so leniently as to deprive them of any
significant restraining force.
Under the facts of Kendrick, each of the religious use factors men-
tioned above creates a strong reason to find that AFLA violates the es-
tablishment clause. With respect to the aid recipient factor, the fact that
AFLA grants are given directly to religious entities rather than to the
users of those entities increases the likelihood that the grants would be
used impermissibly. With respect to the age factor, the counseling serv-
ices supported by AFLA grants are directed at impressionable, pre-col-
lege age adolescents. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the AFLA-
supported counseling services are highly susceptible to ideological bias
and manipulation in the hands of those rendering the services. As
stressed by Justice Blackmun in his Kendrick dissent, counseling adoles-
cents on matters of teenage pregnancy and sexuality is not like running a
soup kitchen for the general public. °1
With the religious use factors operating so strongly against the validity
of AFLA, it is hard to understand the Kendrick majority's conclusion
that AFLA does not violate both the primary effect and entanglement
prongs of the Lemon test. The primary effect of AFLA grants to reli-
gious organizations is clearly to support moral guidance services highly
to all religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting only the Sabbath
observance, I believe an objective observer would perceive it as an anti-discrimi-
nation law rather than an endorsement of religion or a particular religious
practice.
Id. at 712 (citation omitted). Finally, in the recent case of County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989), the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun,
joined in part by Justice O'Connor, used the reasonable or objective observer concept
previously advanced by O'Connor. See id. at 3102. In Allegheny, the county government
displayed, at government expense, a creche scene in the county courthouse; the creche
display did not contain any other significant nonreligious decorations. See id. at 3093-94.
In light of its practical isolation, the Court stated that "[n]o viewer could reasonably
think that it occupies this location without the support and approval of the government.
Thus,... the county sends an unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the
Christian praise to God that is the creche's religious message." Id. at 3104.
197. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2587-88 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
198. See id. at 2589-90.
199. See id. at 2590-91.
200. See supra notes 111-130 and accompanying text.
201. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2591 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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susceptible to religious indoctrination. With respect to the entanglement
prong, government surveillance of an ongoing and deeply intrusive na-
ture would be required to ensure that counseling services provided by
such organizations are not used to transmit religious values and tenets to
the malleable minds of youth. Setting aside hypothetical situations that
approach the absurd, it is hard to imagine a program of governmental aid
that more readily fosters an excessive entanglement between church and
state than the AFLA program challenged in Kendrick.
Like the equal access condition of the total subsidy option, the no reli-
gious use condition is designed to protect against the dangers of entangle-
ment and endorsement described by Justice O'Connor in Lynch. 2 ' If
applied strictly, as it was by the Kendrick dissenters, the three religious
use factors will enable the Court to determine when the danger of reli-
gious use is real. The nature of the service supported factor is an exam-
ple; if government dollars are supporting the moral guidance services of a
religious entity, the twin dangers of entanglement between church and
state and of endorsement of religion are palpably present. In such in-
stances, something approaching a per se rule of invalidity is called for.
This is particularly true when, as in Kendrick, all three religious use fac-
tors strongly indicate that the governmental action in question is invalid.
CONCLUSION
The total subsidy position cannot perform miracles in the defense of
establishment clause values. Even if its two restrictions are stringently
applied, it permits government to provide substantial amounts of aid to
religious entities; the level of that aid becomes largely a question for the
political process to resolve. Moreover, government dollars which sup-
port the secular activities of religious entities enable those organizations
to support their religious activities with other funds.2 03 The total subsidy
option cannot prevent that reality from occurring. Only the Rutledge
option would have been equal to that task, and, for reasons already dis-
cussed, it is too late to adopt that approach.
While it does not prevent government dollars from releasing
nongovernment dollars to support religious activities, the total subsidy
position, if applied in the manner of the Mueller and Kendrick dissents,
can reduce the risks of entanglement between church and state and en-
dorsement of religion by government. For supporters of the Rutledge
option, this may seem to be a hollow victory. It is better, however, than
the approach of the majority opinions in Mueller and Kendrick which
202. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
203. In Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973), the Court readily acknowledged this
reality:
[T]he Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden
because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on
religious ends.
Id. at 743.
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provide no practical restraints to protect establishment clause values. If
the total subsidy option is to have the practical restraining force required
to protect the values embodied in the establishment clause, its equal ac-
cess and no religious use restrictions must be applied with vigor, with a
view to economic and ideological reality. Anything less amounts to an
ill-advised judicial abdication to the political process in this vital area of
constitutional law.

